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ABSTRACT 
The paper examines a wide range of potential predictors of 25 international banking crises 
that broke out in 2007–2011 on the basis of cross–sectional logit models and the BCT (binary 
classification tree) algorithm, a novel technique in assessing the causes of banking crises. The 
major determinants of the crises arise from excessive credit depth (measured as private credit 
to GDP ratio) and illiquidity of the banking sector (credits to deposits ratio). The 
implementation of explicit deposit insurance schemes is also a pro–crisis factor due to the 
moral hazard effect they tend to cause. On the contrary, higher values of remittance inflows 
to GDP decrease the susceptibility to banking crises. These findings are robust under both 
methodologies. Lower bank concentration, bigger values of cost to income ratios as well as a 
higher level of economic liberalization make countries more vulnerable to banking crises, as 
derived from the logit analysis. 
Keywords: banking crisis; Great Recession; logit analysis; binary classification tree. 
JEL: E44, G21.
                                                           
1
 PhD. in Economics and Associate Professor, Department of Applied Economics, Moscow State Institute of 
International Relations (MGIMO–University). Correspondence: 76 Vernadskogo prospect, Moscow 119454 
Russia. E–mail: stolbov_mi@mail.ru. 
 
2 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 The beginning of the Great Recession was marked by a wave of banking 
crises. Unlike previous episodes of financial turmoil, the recent international banking 
meltdown has primarily centered in developed economies. Laeven and Valencia 
(2012) identify 25 systemic and borderline banking crises in 2007–2011, with only 6 
of them taking place in non–OECD countries. 
The banking meltdown triggered the sequential stages of the global financial 
turmoil – sovereign debt crises, but to our knowledge most of the research on the 
2007–2011 banking crises has been carried out at country or regional levels. It 
contrasts with the existing banking crisis literature, e.g. by Demirguc–Kunt and 
Detragiache (1997, 2000, 2005) based on panel data or big cross–sectional datasets. 
In this paper I examine a wide range of potential predictors of the 25 banking 
crises on the basis of traditional cross–sectional logit models and BCT (Binary 
Classification Tree) procedure, a novel approach to banking crisis analysis. The 
combination of the two techniques helps identify the most robust determinants of 
crises. Several notable results are obtained. The major determinants of the crises arise 
from excessive credit depth (private credit to GDP) and illiquidity of the banking 
sector (unbalanced credits to deposits ratio). Higher values of remittance inflows to 
GDP decrease the susceptibility to banking crises while explicit deposit insurance 
schemes fuel them. These are the findings robust under both methodologies. Lower 
bank concentration and higher cost to income ratios as well as a higher level of 
economic liberalization tend to make economies more vulnerable to banking crises, as 
derived from the logit analysis.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the banking crisis 
literature. Section 3 discusses data and methodology. Section 4 presents the results 
and their discussion, followed by concluding remarks in Section 5. 
2. Causes of Banking Crises: A Brief Literature Review2 
The determinants of banking crises can be split into three broad categories: 1) 
macroeconomic fundamentals; 2) aggregate characteristics of the banking sector 
performance (depth, soundness, concentration, etc.); 3) institutional variables. 
However, there has been no clear-cut consensus concerning relative importance of the 
categories and variables falling under each of them. Klomp (2010) finds that there 
exists substantial heterogeneity in the determinants of a banking crisis, identifying 3 
most robust predictors for the period 1970–2007 – a high credit growth, high real 
interest rates and negative GDP growth rates. Yet, none of the indicators has a 
significant impact in more than 60 percent of the banking crises. 
Though the findings of banking crisis research appear sensitive to sample 
composition, a priori selected proxies and modeling techniques, there are several 
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indicators that are found to be more or less reliable crisis predictors in empirical 
studies. As for macroeconomic fundamentals, negative GDP growth rates, high 
inflation and current account balance/GDP ratio are the most frequently mentioned 
proxies since Demirguc–Kunt and Detragiache (1997) paper. Most recent research has 
generally been in line with their findings, adding a number of other promising 
predictors. Duttagupta and Cashin (2011) establish that significant nominal 
depreciation (more than 9%) is conducive to banking crises and it can be reinforced 
by highly dollarized liabilities of the banking sector (over 140% of foreign exchange 
reserves). Angkinand and Willett (2011) examine the impact of exchange rate regimes 
on the probability of banking crises and find that intermediate regimes (i.e. the 
regimes between hard and soft pegs) are mostly crisis–prone. This influence is 
channeled through net foreign borrowing and currency crises. 
A high credit growth and credit/GDP ratio open the second group of 
indicators. Not only credit depth, but also its composition matter. Buyukkarabacak 
and Valev (2010) find that a larger share of household credit relative to business loans 
increases proneness towards banking crises. A higher overall capital adequacy and 
liquidity position of the banking sector constitute a buffer against banking crises. The 
conclusion has recently been confirmed by Caprio et. al (2010) and Barrell et. al 
(2011). Barrell et. al (2010) also find that the two indicators along with property 
prices can outperform macroeconomic variables as predictors of banking crises and 
this is especially true in case of developed economies. Besides capital adequacy and a 
sound liquidity position, a higher concentration in the banking system tends to have a 
positive impact on its stability and thus reduces the likelihood of crises. This effect is 
pronounced in cross–country studies, though subject to variation when analyzed along 
with regulatory and institutional features (Beck et. al 2013). Its theoretical 
underpinning posits that in more concentrated banking systems banks have better 
profit opportunities and fewer incentives to take aggressive risks. This result has two 
straightforward implications. First, it necessitates a balanced view on the impact of 
financial liberalization on the occurrence of banking crises. Second, it brings to the 
fore the analysis of institutional features of banking systems. 
Using a dataset on financial reforms in 48 countries between 1973 and 2005, 
Angkinand et. al (2010) establish an inverted U–shaped relationship between financial 
liberalization and the likelihood of banking crises. They link this relationship with the 
strength of capital regulation and supervision. If they are very weak, the probability of 
a banking crisis is on the rise with further liberalization but the linkage is reversed as 
capital regulation and supervision get stricter. Better supervision is closely related to 
more intense political competition as the latter implies a better design of checks and 
balances and ultimately fewer rent–seeking opportunities (Amri and Kocher 2012). A 
higher degree of central bank independence also tends to decrease the probability of 
banking crises (Khan et al. 2011). Ahrend et. al (2011) find that the strength of 
prudential banking regulation is well and negatively correlated with the extent to 
which countries suffered from banking crises in 2007–2009.  
Among other proxies that reduce the likelihood of banking crises credit 
information sharing is to be mentioned. As a study of 98 countries between 1975 and 
2006 shows, the development of both public registries and private credit bureaus 
deters an unbalanced credit expansion, thus preventing an outbreak of a banking 
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crisis. The benign effect of credit information sharing is especially sizeable in low 
income countries (Buyukkarabacak and Valev 2012).  
The explicit deposit insurance scheme (EDIS) has been considered as a pro–
crisis factor causing moral hazard and loosening market discipline, but once the 
interaction between the overall economic development and the use of EDIS is 
controlled for, the significance of this institutional variable becomes questionable 
(Khan and Dewan 2011). The recent empirical literature motivates the selection of 
potential crisis proxies for my paper. 
3. Data and Methodology 
At first I apply standard (conditional fixed-effects) logit models to figure out 
the predictors of the 2007–2011 banking crises. The information on the countries 
engulfed by the crises and their starting dates is taken from Laeven and Valencia 
(2012). Only the first year of the crises is taken in account as a binary dependent 
variable (Appendix, table A1). 
In the previous literature on banking crises promising proxies have, as a rule, 
been selected a priori on the basis of earlier theoretical and empirical findings, 
common sense or researchers’ specific interests. In this analysis I am free of any a 
priori judgments on the applicability of this or that independent variable. Rather, I 
resort to a rich dataset Global Financial Development Database (GFDD) introduced 
by the World Bank (Cihak et al. 2012). It comprises 71 financial data series for 203 
countries and territories since 1960. It contains data on financial institution and 
market depth, access, stability and efficiency.  
Then I add to the dataset a number of potentially valuable proxies accounting 
for institutional features of the countries and their banking systems. I include 1) 
monetary (monfr) and financial freedom (finfr) indices computed by Heritage 
Foundation; 2) KOF index of economic globalization (Dreher 2006); 3) credit depth 
of information and strength of legal rights indices as well as public credit registry and 
private credit bureau percentage coverage of adults, all the data retrieved from Doing 
Business; 4) a de-jure measure of financial openness (kaopen) (Chinn and Ito 2008); 
5) three binary dummy variables accounting for OECD membership (OECD_dummy), 
the implementation of the EDIS (EDIS_dummy) and the existence of a unified 
financial regulator (regulat_dummy) (either the central bank or financial services 
authority (FSA)), the latter two coming from the International Deposit Insurer 
Association and the World Bank Dataset on Supervisory Structures. Conventional 
macroeconomic fundamentals – current account balance/GDP ratio, real interest rate, 
real effective exchange rate index (2005=100) and GDP per capita growth – have also 
been incorporated into the initial dataset. All the independent variables refer to the 
year preceding the outbreak of the banking crises3.  
To reduce the dimension of the initial dataset, I apply ANOVA test to find 
variables that best discriminate between the countries with and without the banking 
crisis. Of the feasible variables identified with ANOVA I keep in the analysis those 
with not more than 25% of missing observations. It is done to eliminate a possible 
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bias towards developed countries in the sample as most of the data on financial 
stability and efficiency are available for these economies and are largely missing for 
developing ones. Finally I estimate logit models taking into account possible 
multicollinearity. The main criteria of the model selection are the area under the ROC 
curve and pseudo R2. 
Davis et. al (2011) argue that it may be naive and ultimately inappropriate to 
model the likelihood of banking crises in a cross–regional pool of countries as crisis 
determinants may substantially differ. To reconcile my analysis with the critique I 
verify the robustness of the results by applying random–effects logit models and a 
binary classification tree (BCT) algorithm4. The BCT is a non–parametric statistical 
method that, starting with the whole sample, compares all the possible proxies of 
banking crises at different threshold levels and selects an indicator (and its particular 
threshold) that best splits the sample into “purer” sub-samples, where the probability 
of the crisis increases or declines significantly compared with the sample average. 
The splitting process continues until terminal nodes are identified5.  
The BCT approach is useful when there are missing values of explanatory 
variables and extreme outliers in a dataset. Besides, it is instrumental in terms of 
multi-collinearity and nonlinear relationships between predictors. This methodology 
has been used to establish causes of currency and sovereign debt crises (Frankel and 
Wei 2004; Manasse and Roubini 2005) but to our knowledge there has been a single 
case of its application to banking crises (Duttagupta and Cashin 2011). As an 
alternative to standard regression methods, the BCT algorithm may yield results 
different from the traditional logit analysis. As an alternative to standard regression 
methods, the BCT algorithm may yield results different from the traditional logit 
analysis. 
4. Results and Discussion 
By means of ANOVA test 31 potential predictors of the banking crises have 
been identified (Appendix, Table A2, variables marked in green). The most 
unexpected result is that the macroeconomic fundamentals (current account 
balance/GDP ratio, real interest rate, real effective exchange rate index and GDP per 
capita annual growth) do not contribute to the discrimination between countries with 
and without banking crises. However, it may be due to the fact that the data refer to a 
single year preceding the crisis and does not rule out the significance of these 
variables if, for example, their averages for a longer pre-crisis period were used. 
Absolute values of GDP and GNP have intentionally been excluded from further 
analysis despite their statistical significance. These indicators merely reflect the 
concentration of the 2007–2011 crisis episodes in advanced economies. As a result, a 
positive correlation between absolute values of GDP and the occurrence of banking 
crises is observed. It hasn’t been typical before and is unlikely to occur in the future. 
Had the variables been included in the logit analysis, they might have produced a 
distortionary effect by suppressing potentially relevant regressors. 
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Taking into account cross–correlations (Appendix, Table 3A) to avoid 
multicollinearity, I estimate different logit models and select three most appropriate 
on the basis of the area under the ROC curve and pseudo R2. The reduced-form 
equations (only statistically significant predictors) are reported below. 
Table 1 
Estimation results – baseline (fixed-effects) logit models 
Predictor Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Constant 
Average consumer 
price index 
Bank concentration 
 
Bank credits to 
deposits 
Bank private credit 
to GDP 
Cost to income ratio 
Remittance inflows 
to GDP 
Monetary freedom 
index 
KOF_index 
Private credit bureau 
coverage 
EDIS_dummy                
                                   
Bank concentration* 
*EDIS_dummy 
 
Number of obs. 
Number of crises 
Number of non 
crises 
   –43.72**                    
(–2.47) 
   0.35*                           
(1.66)                                               
      –0.13***                          
(–2.83) 
                                                
0.02*                             
(1.92) 
                                    
0.04*                              
(1.71) 
      0.28***                               
(2.83) 
  –0.56*                        
(-1.70) 
  0.25*                            
(1.79) 
    0.15**                               
(2.53) 
  –0.07**                          
(–2.27) 
                    
 
 
                                             
110 
24 
86                                                        
                                        
–20.41***                     
(–2.85) 
 
    –0.08**                            
(–2.24) 
                                          
0.01*                             
(1.68) 
                                      
0.05**                             
(2.17) 
      0.23***                               
(2.68) 
  –0.48*                             
(-1.78) 
                            
                                    
0.10**                               
(2.09) 
  –0.05**                      
(–2.26)                   
2.51*                          
(1.74)   
                                     
 
                       
113 
24 
89                                                        
                                       
  –14.43***              
(–2.94)                 
0.21*                           
(1.72)                                               
      –0.08***                             
(–2.86) 
                                                     
0.01**                           
(1.99) 
                                     
0.05**                              
(1.71) 
      0.18***                               
(3.05) 
  –0.32*                             
(-1.89) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   0.04**                          
(2.12) 
                                       
128                                         
24 
104 
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Pseudo R2 
Area under the ROC 
curve 
% crises correctly 
predicted 
% non crises 
correctly predicted 
0.74 
0.98 
                                     
79.17  
                                      
97.67 
0.73 
0.97 
                                     
83.33 
                                      
98.88 
0.65 
0.96 
                                      
79.17 
                                    
98.08 
 Note: Z–values between brackets. 
 * Significance at 10 percent. 
 ** Significance at 5 percent. 
 *** Significance at 1 percent. 
 Bank concentration and cost to income ratio in the banking sector appear to be the 
most robust predictors of the 2007–2011 international banking crises. A higher concentration 
in the banking system tends to curb its major players’ risk–taking. The conclusion meshes 
well with the earlier cross–country research findings. Bank efficiency matters as cost to 
income ratio indicates: less cost efficient banking systems are more fragile. Bank private 
credit to GDP and credits to deposits ratio are also important crisis proxies across all the three 
specifications, though their overall statistical significance is weaker. Thus, excessive credit 
depth of an economy as well as a lack of banking sector liquidity increase the proneness 
towards crises while larger remittance inflows relative to GDP have a stabilizing effect. A 
higher degree of economic liberalization (KOF index, monetary freedom index), inflation and 
the implementation of deposit insurance undermine financial stability, whereas private credit 
information sharing deters banking crises. When a high bank concentration is complemented 
with an explicit deposit insurance scheme (Bank concentration*EDIS_dummy), it increases 
the probability of a banking crisis due to moral hazard and partly suppresses the positive 
effect of a high bank concentration when considered alone. In terms of the crisis it is likely to 
aggravate the “too big to fail” problem. This quantitative finding unambiguously supports the 
idea by Raghuram Rajan (2010) that deposit insurance should be phased out for major banks. 
This measure can mitigate the moral hazard problem and can also have a positive impact on 
the banking sector competition.  
I check the robustness of the findings by computing random-effects versions of the 
above models. These models are aimed at accounting for sample heterogeneity that can make 
the results of the pooled models unreliable. The coefficients of random-effects logit models 
are reported below. They largely confirm the previous findings. 
Table 2 
Estimation results – random-effects logit models 
Predictor Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Constant 
Average consumer 
   –210.44*                     
(–1.63) 
 1.06                          
–20.41***                     
(–2.85) 
  –14.43***              
(–2.94)                 
0.21*                           
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price index 
Bank concentration 
 
Bank credits to 
deposits 
Bank private credit 
to GDP 
Cost to income ratio 
Remittance inflows 
to GDP 
Monetary freedom 
index 
KOF_index 
Private credit bureau 
coverage 
EDIS_dummy                                                                             
                                   
Bank concentration* 
EDIS_dummy 
(1.00)                                               
–0.77                             
(–1.56) 
                         
0.14*                             
(1.72) 
                                     
0.19                              
(1.00) 
  1.54*                               
(1.66) 
  –4.68*                             
(-1.80) 
1.10                              
(1.44) 
    0.87*                               
(1.77) 
–0.42                                   
(–1.47) 
                    
 
 
                                             
 
 
  –0.83**                            
(–2.24) 
                        
0.14*                             
(1.68) 
                                      
0.05**                             
(2.17) 
      0.23***                               
(2.68) 
  –0.48*                             
(-1.78) 
                                          
    0.10**                               
(2.09) 
  –0.05**                      
(–2.26)                   
2.51*                          
(1.74)   
                                      
 
                                      
 
(1.72)                                               
      –0.08***                             
(–2.86) 
                                                     
0.01**                           
(1.99) 
                                     
0.05***                            
(3.27) 
      0.18***                               
(3.05) 
  –0.32*                             
(-1.89) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.04**                          
(2.12)                                   
 
 Note: Z–values between brackets. 
 * Significance at 10 percent. 
 ** Significance at 5 percent. 
 *** Significance at 1 percent. 
Finally, I check the validity of the conclusions obtained via logit analysis by 
applying a binary classification tree algorithm. Again, I keep in the analysis the 
variables with not more than 25% of missing observations and exclude GDP–related 
indicators. No other prior filtering of the data is applied6. The results can be visualized 
as follows. 
                                                           
6
 ANOVA is redundant as reducing the dimension of the data is embedded in the BCT algorithm. 
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           <= 1.43
Terminal 
Node 1
Class = 0
Class   Cases    %
0 99 100.0
1 0 0.0
W = 99.00
N = 99
 
          <= 96.13
Terminal 
Node 2
Class = 0
Class   Cases    %
0 12 100.0 
1 0 0.0
W = 12.00 
N = 12
 
          96.13
Terminal
Node 3
Class = 1
Class   Cases   % 
0 0 0.0
1 1 100.0 
W = 1.00
N = 1 
  
          >  1.43 
Node 3
Class = 0
Credits to deposits ratio <= 96.13
Class   Cases   % 
0 12 92.3
1 1 7.7
W = 13.00 
N = 13
 
          <= 0.50
Node 2
Class = 0
Number of listed companies <= 1.43
Class   Cases   % 
0 111 99.1 
1 1 0.9
W = 112.00
N = 112
 
 <= 125660376
Terminal 
Node 4
Class = 0 
Class   Cases    %
0 36 100.0
1 0 0.0
W = 36.00 
N = 36
 
               >125660376
Terminal
Node 5
Class = 1
Class   Cases     %
0 4 66.7 
1 2 33.3 
W = 6.00
N = 6 
 
          <= 43.34
Node 5
Class = 0
Population <= 125660376
Class    Cases     % 
0 40 95.2 
1 2 4.8
W = 42.00 
N = 42
 
         <= 0.93
Terminal 
Node 6
Class = 1
Class   Cases    %
0 9 29.0
1 22 71.0
W = 31.00 
N = 31
 
         >  0.93 
Terminal 
Node 7 
Class = 0
Class   Cases    %
0 4 100.0
1 0 0.0
W = 4.00
N = 4
 
                       <= 3.41 
Node 7 
Class = 1
Number of listed companies <= 0.93 
Class   Cases     %
0 13 37.1
1 22 62.9
W = 35.00 
N = 35
 
           >  3.41 
Terminal
Node 8 
Class = 0
Class   Cases   %
0 14 100.0 
1 0 0.0
W = 14.00 
N = 14
 
          >  43.34
Node 6
Class = 1
Remittance inflows to GDP <= 3.41
Class    Cases     %
0 27 55.1 
1 22 44.9 
W = 49.00 
N = 49
 
          >  0.50
Node 4
Class = 1
Private credit to GDP <= 43.34
Class  Cases   % 
0 67 73.6 
1 24 26.4 
W = 91.00 
N = 91
Node 1
Class = 0
EDIS_dummy <= 0.50
Class   Cases   % 
0 178 87.7 
1 25 12.3 
W = 203.00 
N = 203
 
Figure 1. BCT analysis results.  
The BCT algorithm identifies the implementation of the explicit deposit 
insurance scheme as the first–order sample splitter (node 1). Mongolia was the only 
country without the EDIS affected by the banking crisis. This crisis is related to a high 
credits to deposits ratio (node 3 and terminal node 3) which totaled 99.6% one year 
before the start of the crisis. The indicator reflects the adverse consequences of the 
credit boom in Mongolia in the 2000s when its domestic credit to GDP quadrupled 
while financial soundness of the banking system left much to desire (Rodolfo et. al 
2013). The credit boom was fueled by high commodity prices as Mongolia is a typical 
resource rich economy. 
The second–order splitter is private credit to GDP ratio. The threshold of the 
indicator is 43.34%: for 22 countries that experienced banking crises it was exceeded 
(node 4 and 5). It could be offset by higher values of remittance inflows to GDP if it 
is over 3.41% (node 6 and 8). However, if this condition doesn’t hold, a deeper stock 
market (number of listed companies per 10k population) is associated with the 
deterrence of banking crises (less than 0.93). On the contrary, if this indicator is 
below the threshold, it increases the proneness towards the crisis (node 6 and 7 and 
terminal node 7). 
There were two countries (Russia and Nigeria) that faced the crisis at a lower 
private credit to GDP ratio. They are identified with the population size within the 
framework of the BCT algorithm, which sheds little light on deeper causes of the 
crises in these countries (node 5 and terminal node 5). This result along with the 
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special case of Mongolia emphasizes the importance of specific research of the crisis 
anatomy in resource rich economies. 
5. Concluding Remarks 
The paper examines the causes of the 2007–2011 international banking crises 
using logit analysis and binary classification tree algorithm. Though the two 
methodologies conceptually differ, the results have much in common. The major 
determinants of the crises are related to excessive credit depth (private credit to GDP 
ratio) and low liquidity of the banking sector (credits to deposits ratio). Higher values 
of remittance inflows to GDP diminish the susceptibility to banking crises while 
explicit deposit insurance schemes fuel them. These are the findings consistent with 
both methodologies. Also, lower bank concentration and higher cost to income ratios 
are important pro–crisis factors. A higher level of economic liberalization tends to 
make economies more vulnerable to banking crises as well. 
The findings of the paper are relevant to design efficient early warning 
indicators of banking crises as well as to improve the regulation of the sector at 
national and international levels, taking into account the lessons of the recent global 
financial crisis. 
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Appendix 
Table A1 
Country Start of crisis 
Austria 2008 
Belguim 2008 
Denmark 2008 
Germany 2008 
Greece 2008 
Iceland 2008 
Ireland 2008 
Kazakhstan 2008 
Latvia 2008 
Luxembourg 2008 
Mongolia 2008 
Netherlands 2008 
Nigeria 2009 
Spain 2008 
Ukraine 2008 
UK 2007 
USA 2007 
France 2008 
Hungary 2008 
Italy 2008 
Portugal 2008 
Russia 2008 
Slovenia 2008 
Sweden 2008 
Switzerland 2008 
Source: Laeven and Valencia (2012). 
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Table A2 
 Descriptive Statistics and ANOVA results
Variable
Valid
N
Mean Min Max Std.Dev
.
ANOVA
p-value
5-bank asset concentration (%)
Average Consumer Price Index (2005=100)
Average consumer price Index (annual % change)
Bank accounts per 1000 adults (commercial banks-bank survey)
Bank branches per 100,000 adults (commercial banks)
Bank capital to total assets (%)
Bank concentration (%)
Bank credit to bank deposits (%)
Bank deposits to GDP (%)
Bank non-performing loans to gross loans (%)
Bank private credit to GDP (%)
Bank Z-score
Boone indicator
Central bank assets to GDP (%)
Consolidated foreign claims of BIS-reporting banks to GDP (%)
Corporate bonds to total bonds and notes outstanding (%)
Cost to income ratio (%)
Credit to government and state-owned enterprises to GDP (%)
December Consumper Price Index (2005=100)
Deposit money bank assets to deposit money bank assets and central bank assets (%)
Deposit money bank assets to GDP (%)
Financial system deposits to GDP (%)
Firms with line of credit to total firms (all firms) (%)
GDP (Current USD)
GDP per Capita (Constant 2000 USD)
GDP per capita (current US$)
GNI (Current USD)
Gross portfolio debt liabilities to GDP (%)
Gross portfolio equity assets to GDP (%)
Gross portfolio equity liabilities to GDP (%)
Insurance company assets to GDP (%)
International debt issues to GDP (%)
Lending-deposit spread (%)
Lerner index
Life insurance premium volume to GDP (%)
Liquid assets to deposits and short term funding (%)
Liquid liabilities in millions 2000 USD
Liquid liabilities to GDP (%)
Loans from non-resident banks (amounts outstanding) to GDP (%)
Loans from non-resident banks (net) to GDP (%)
Mutual fund assets to GDP (%)
Net interest margin (%)
Non-bank financial institutions assets to GDP (%)
Non-interest income to total income (%)
Non-Life insurance premium volume to GDP (%)
Number of listed companies per 10,000 people
Offshore bank deposits to domestic bank deposits (%)
Outstanding domestic private debt securities to GDP (%)
Outstanding domestic public debt securities to GDP (%)
Outstanding international private debt decurities to GDP (%)
Outstanding international public debt securities to GDP (%)
Overhead costs to total assets (%)
Pension fund assets to GDP (%)
Percentage of foreign bank assets among total bank assets (%)
Percentage of foreign banks among total banks (%)
Population, Total
Private credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions to GDP (%)
Provisions to non-performing loans (%)
Regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets (%)
Remittance inflows to GDP (%)
Return on assets (%)
Return on equity (%)
Small firms with line of credit to total small firms (%)
Stock market capitalization to GDP (%)
Stock market total value traded to GDP (%)
Stock market turnover ratio (value traded/capitalization) (%)
Value traded of top 10 traded companies to total value traded (%)
Volatility of stock price index
OECD_dummy
regulat_dummy
Current account balance (% of GDP)
Real interest rate (%)
Real effective exchange rate index (2005 = 100)
GDP per capita growth (annual %)
monfr
finfr
kof_index
kaopen
Credit depth of information index (0=low to 6=high)
Private credit bureau coverage (% of adults)
Public credit registry coverage (% of adults)
Strength of legal rights index (0=weak to 10=strong)
EDIS_dummy
139 75.7 28 100.0 17.5 0.000
178 112.9 91 258.5 14.6 0.108
176 5.9 -9 35.0 4.8 0.085
67 819.7 4 7293.6 1165.6 0.118
120 18.3 0 98.0 18.5 0.000
93 9.5 3 22.5 3.9 0.004
160 65.3 21 100.0 20.7 0.000
178 99.5 19 858.5 80.9 0.000
169 51.4 5 575.9 56.5 0.000
93 4.0 0 25.6 4.5 0.033
171 49.5 2 335.5 50.9 0.000
180 17.8 -2 53.6 9.9 0.389
172 -0.1 -2 1.6 0.3 0.723
146 5.1 0 151.3 13.4 0.209
178 156.2 0 13766.0 1062.4 0.987
44 38.7 0 96.7 24.9 0.015
171 54.4 17 116.8 15.4 0.062
169 8.8 0 60.2 9.5 0.760
179 12343.4 94 2188589.0 163574.1 0.688
150 88.2 7 100.0 15.8 0.017
171 56.7 3 335.5 50.9 0.000
169 51.6 5 575.9 56.5 0.000
11 26.5 4 67.3 18.5 n/a
194 2.85E+11 26980289 1.40E+13 1.15E+12 0.000
191 8867.3 98 98397.1 14445.0 0.000
194 14282.5 165 169269.6 23571.1 0.000
193 2.86E+11 48174819 1.41E+13 1.17E+12 0.000
82 17.6 0 263.7 34.8 0.000
84 16.1 0 248.5 36.9 0.000
77 15.8 0 209.4 32.9 0.042
112 14.9 0 100.3 23.1 0.000
98 30.8 0 328.9 47.2 0.000
137 7.6 0 33.1 5.7 0.059
120 0.3 0 0.7 0.1 0.003
78 3.1 0 31.3 4.8 0.005
169 39.3 8 89.0 17.6 0.216
176 256456.3 44 8532822.0 996428.7 0.000
170 56.9 6 380.3 46.5 0.000
181 147.4 0 11570.1 909.8 0.896
49 1.3 0 8.6 1.6 0.185
59 122.2 0 5232.8 681.6 0.145
168 3.6 -4 12.1 2.3 0.000
43 4705.1 0 201670.7 30752.2 0.790
168 40.0 11 195.2 20.1 0.305
78 2.1 0 8.9 1.4 0.000
111 0.3 0 2.5 0.5 0.881
159 159.8 0 14939.1 1200.3 0.531
46 35.0 0 303.4 51.5 0.002
50 34.0 3 157.3 24.5 0.678
64 26.2 0 305.4 47.2 0.000
77 8.0 0 46.6 9.5 0.379
155 3.19 -0 10.4 2.1 0.003
62 22.34 0 128.8 31.8 0.166
129 38.26 0 100.0 33.0 0.005
136 41.77 0 100.0 27.9 0.063
203 3.26E+07 9762 1.32E+09 1.28E+08 0.678
171 52.44 2 335.5 54.4 0.000
87 83.15 7 209.8 45.3 0.603
97 14.90 8 35.0 4.4 0.001
158 5.20 0 45.5 7.7 0.004
182 1.63 -1 5.8 1.0 0.000
182 16.27 -47 70.1 10.7 0.045
11 20.29 3 60.2 18.2 n/a
100 297.37 1 22306.3 2224.3 0.600
98 59.68 0 754.0 105.7 0.068
96 66.76 0 271.7 69.0 0.001
43 52.81 13 97.8 21.6 0.069
82 22.48 9 55.8 9.2 0.436
203 0.17 0 1.0 0.4 0.000
203 0.13 0 1.0 0.3 0.000
162 -3.31 -45 39.7 13.3 0.455
147 5.53 -8 35.8 6.7 0.136
94 102.61 83 126.2 7.2 0.716
192 4.39 -11 23.6 4.4 0.584
155 74.81 0 94.3 9.0 0.012
155 51.94 10 90.0 19.0 0.000
150 62.99 24 96.4 17.2 0.000
177 0.49 -2 2.5 1.7 0.000
179 2.63 0 6.0 2.2 0.000
174 19.12 0 100.0 31.1 0.004
175 4.23 0 67.1 10.1 0.012
179 5.23 0 10.0 2.5 0.002
203 0.45 0 1.0 0.5 0.000
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